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CROWNING GLORY: PUBLIC LAW, POWER AND THE MONARCHY 
 
 ‘New public law’ has a keen interest in the deployment of power and the shifting nature of 
the public and private. In this article, we argue that the historical legacy of the Crown has 
hindered the ability of public lawyers to respond to changes in modes of governance in the 
UK. The constitutional law textbook tradition has played a key role in limiting critiques of the 
Crown because of the obfuscation that surrounds the legal and political status of the 
Monarch. However, instead of discounting the significance of the monarchy, we use it as a 
resource for exploring governing power, the blurring of boundaries and constitutional 
renewal. Our starting point is the life, death and, most importantly, the funeral of Diana, 
Princess of Wales. The latter event exposed the political relevance of the ‘personal’ in a most 
dramatic way, generating claims about the ‘feminisation of the government’ and ‘emotions 
augmenting democracy’. We follow through on these claims in order to focus on the effects of 
adopting private, intimate-sphere norms in the public sphere, in particular public-sphere 
decision making. While aware of the risks associated with this ‘transformation’ of democracy, 
we conclude that the increasing centrality of the intimate merits consideration in new public 
law’s search for progressive tools of modern governance. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
PUBLIC LAW is now in vogue in the UK and there is an excitement about a subject that has 
failed traditionally to capture the public imagination (Barnett, 1997; Freedland, 1998). Credit 
for this change of outlook tends to go to New Labour and its constitutional reform 
programme, described by the Lord Chancellor as ‘arguably the most radical . . . since the 
Great Reform Bill of 1832’ (Irvine, 1998: 1). To date, the highpoints in this ongoing project 
of modernising British political institutions are devolved government for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, the Human Rights Act 1998, House of Lords reform and an elected London 
mayor (Blackburn and Plant, 1999a; Partridge, 1999).1  
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Modernisation is also the theme of what can be described as ‘new public law’ scholarship 
(Millns and Whitty, 1999). The historical parameters of public law writing are collapsing 
amid the sense of constitutional upheaval and renewal, and as Loughlin argues, ‘[f]ew people 
seem able any longer to call to mind a world in which the British constitution made sense. . .’ 
(1997: 1). New public law’s key challenge is to the doctrinal tradition familiar to generations 
of law students – best exemplified in Constitutional and Administrative Law, the textbook by 
Bradley and Ewing (1997). This tradition is founded on a ‘series of comfortable ideas handed 
down from Blackstone to Bagehot to Dicey’ that confine contemporary public law textbooks 
to ‘parameters set within a different age’ (Morison and Livingstone, 1995: 1, 6). The 
influence of Dicey, ‘the high priest of orthodox constitutional theory’, is particularly 
pernicious (Loughlin, 1992: 140). In the Diceyan tradition, Parliament is the absolute locus of 
political authority with the result that ‘the main textbooks . . . [still] reveal a world where the 
exercise of power is more or less neatly within the collection of institutions that the accidents 
of a long history have thrown up’ (Morison and Livingstone, 1995: 6).  
 
New public law scholarship exposes the deficiencies of this doctrinal tradition by 
emphasising the redrawing of public and private. It argues that privatisation of utilities, 
deregulation, contracting-out of services and the creation of new executive agencies and 
quangos represent radical changes in public administration, changes that undermine orthodox 
constitutionalism (Harlow, 1994; Taggart, 1999). A particular criticism is the inadequacy of a 
court-centered, remedy-based system of administrative law (see, for example, Wade and 
Forsyth, 1994) in responding to the privatisation and contractualisation process (Galligan, 
1996; Harlow and Rawlings, 1997; Prosser, 1997; Taggart, 1997). New public law’s key 
recognition is that ‘[w]ith the systematic dispersal of the sites of power beyond the confines 
of what we had learned to recognize as the state, the old certainties of public law are no 
longer there’ (Sedley, 1997: vii).  
 
The new  certainty of public law is ‘constitutional reform’. Throughout the 1980s, and 
certainly since the election of the New Labour government in 1997, a conviction has 
solidified among mainstream public lawyers (Beatson et al., 1998; Brazier, 1999) that a 
modernisation programme is the remedy for ailing British constitutionalism. In short, 
replacing Diceyan orthodoxy is now the new orthodoxy in public law (Hunt, 1998; Loughlin, 
1997; Morison and Livingstone, 1995). Once again, though, new public law is sceptical. It is 
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not opposed to the modernisation of political institutions or the development of a rights 
culture in UK law; rather, it argues that the nature of the late capitalist state necessitates fresh 
approaches to public power and democracy: 
 
The problem with the Labour government [reform] proposals is that they are wrongly 
focused on the traditional agenda of restraining ‘big government’ and shoring up 
traditional ideas of representative government. Proposals, however well intentioned, 
about restoring representativeness to the regions, revitalizing Parliament, and ensuring 
accountability and openness in Westminster and Whitehall are missing the point. . . . 
As we approach the twenty-first century these reforms seem located in the past. 
(Morison, 1998: 512) 
 
Morison nominates constitutional renewal as the largely unrecognised but vital supplement to 
the constitutional reform project. In order to renew itself, public law must be able to do two 
things: first, it must tame the ‘fugitive power’ that operates at levels above, below and 
through the state as a consequence of privatisation, Europeanisation and globalisation. 
Secondly, it needs to follow through on the insights of radical, communicative and 
participatory democracy, guiding us towards ‘new ways to institutionalise democracy beyond 
parliaments, committees and codes for conduct . . .’ (Morison, 1998: 512). 
 
In this article, we promote the idea of constitutional renewal by addressing several concerns 
of the new public law scholarship: the textbook tradition; the concept of the state; and the 
blurring of conventional public/private divides. We use what may seem to be an unusual 
vehicle: the monarchy (and the concept of the Crown), and in particular, the death of Diana, 
Princess of Wales.2 At first sight, furthering constitutional renewal by focusing on any aspect 
of the monarchy may seem ironic, even irrelevant. The New Labour modernisation 
programme has carefully excluded the paramount hereditary institution from its remit 
(Blackburn and Plant, 1999b: 140; Hames and Leonard, 1998). The Diceyan constitutional 
law textbook tradition has never wavered from anything other than a deferential royalist tone. 
Even new public law scholarship remains to be convinced; it either ignores Diana’s life and 
death, or treats it as politically insignificant. 
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We seek to challenge these assumptions by using the feminist insight that ‘the personal is 
political’. There are two aspects to our argument. First, we critique the way that public law 
obfuscates the myriad distinctions between the Crown as a concept of state/government and 
the Crown as monarch (i.e. the Queen). While the era of personal rule by monarchs is long 
gone, central government is still legally personified as the Crown and continues to benefit 
from immunities and privileges established in an earlier monarchical age; the state hides 
‘behind the screen of the personalized image of the monarch like an extension of the royal 
household’ (Harlow and Rawlings, 1997: 6).  
 
In the first section of the article, we illustrate how the public law textbook tradition shores up 
this construction of the monarchy. In the second section, we look at the consequences that 
this has had for developing a concept of the state in public law. We argue that historically the 
concept of the Crown has stymied interest in the idea of the state and that, more recently, it 
has thwarted new public law critiques of modern state administration. The final section of the 
article introduces the second aspect of our argument about the personal and political. It 
begins with an account of the life, death and, more particularly,  the funeral of Diana, 
Princess of Wales and develops into an examination of the increasing centrality of the 
intimate to ‘conventionally more impersonal fields of social action’ (McNay, 1999: 113). Our 
particular interest in this section is in the effects of adopting private (or, more accurately, 
intimate) sphere norms in the public sphere, in particular in public-sphere decision making. 
 
The argument in the final section develops from Giddens’ ideas about the ‘transformation of 
intimacy’ (1992). As we see it, two particular claims have emerged under this broad heading. 
First, the idea of democratising the intimate sphere, by releasing expressive possibilities – in 
particular for refashioning identity and renegotiating gender relations – through the processes 
of detraditionalisation associated with late modernity. Secondly, the idea of feminising the 
public sphere, particularly the public political sphere, by using intimate-sphere norms to 
augment government and democracy. The latter claim is the one that interests us in the final 
section of this article. We realise that the idea of the feminisation of government may seem 
miles away from the legitimate concerns of public law; even new public law, which discusses 
privatisation, contractualisation and the question of public/private law values, ignores this 
second angle on the contemporary blurring of public and private, personal and political. We 
also accept that Giddens’ arguments about the effects of the centrality of the intimate are 
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contested: as McNay says, ‘[o]n the one hand, it is associated with a regression of the public 
sphere and a fetishization of the self. On the other hand, it could be seen as potentially 
emancipatory in that it is no longer exclusively women who are burdened with the 
responsibility for the emotional’ (Douglas, 1988; McNay, 1999: 113). It is against this 
backdrop that we set out to identify possible starting points for an exploration of the 
feminisation of democracy within new public law.           
 
THE MONARCHY AND PUBLIC LAW TEXTBOOKS 
 
Royalty has always had a good press in law texts. The tone is respectful, if not downright 
deferential. Moreover, while law students are no longer expected to know the full royal 
lineage, it is quickly made clear to the reader that constitutional law can only be understood 
through a monarchical lens. Key themes are copied from text to text: the British monarchy’s 
alleged continuity, stability and the glamour of its pageantry; its lack of real political power; 
and, most emphatically, its guarantee of the national identity (Hitchens, 1990; Whitty, 1999). 
Overall, the treatment is uncritical and one-dimensional, reminiscent of an earlier era of 
general academic commentary on the monarchy (Martin, 1962; Wilson, 1989: 1–2). While 
other disciplines such as politics (Nairn, 1988), history (Cannadine, 1983, 1997: 1–67) or 
gender studies (Fraser, 1997; Lewis, 1998) now offer alternative, multilayered accounts of 
monarchy, contemporary public law remains trapped within a conservative political 
mythology about the Crown.  
 
The deferential style of public law scholarship is largely related to the origins and evolution 
of the constitutional law textbook tradition (Sugarman, 1986). The early authorities, such as 
Bagehot’s The English Constitution (1872), established a dogmatic monarchical tone which 
still dominates legal writing today.3 For example, a prominent, contemporary text, 
Bogdanor’s The Monarchy and the Constitution (1995), constructs an unbroken narrative 
across the decades: 
 
It is known, indeed, that George V, George VI, Elizabeth II, and the Prince of Wales 
have all studied The English Constitution. Since Victoria the changes in the role of the 
monarchy have been changes in degree and not in kind. There have been no  
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fundamental alterations to the monarchical model as it had evolved by the end of 
Victoria’s reign. (1995: 40–41) 
  
The canonical status of Bagehot is largely unquestioned. In a 1992 study of the British 
constitution, Mount found that ‘[a]ll royal biographers, all newspaper leader-writers and 
virtually all constitutional writers who have bothered to devote a page or two to the monarchy 
have followed Bagehot’s formula, either tamely repeating it as gospel or rewriting it in their 
own words’ (1992: 94). A cursory look at the contents of the public law textbook confirms 
this. The Bagehot orthodoxy is so well established that successive editions of undergraduate 
law texts maintain the same paragraphs on the monarchy (Bradley and Ewing, 1997: 253–62; 
De Smith and Brazier, 1989: 111–27; Hood Phillips and Jackson, 1987: 255–61). Even more 
critical public law texts pay scant attention to the significance of monarchy. McEldowney, 
while providing a wide-ranging account of public law issues, devotes just three pages to the 
monarchy and references Bagehot as ‘useful’ reading (1998: 86–8). Turpin includes a range 
of materials on constitutionalism and constitutional reform but never critiques the monarchy 
itself. Turpin recognises, however, that ‘the Queen has still a pivotally symbolic role . . .’ 
(1995: 144). 
 
Not surprisingly, first year law students can be taken aback when confronted with the stance 
of public law texts. In their eyes, the concepts of monarchy and Crown evoke memories of 
two decades of saturation coverage of ‘the Royals’ – generally commencing with Prince 
Charles’ search for a princess, through the televised Royal Wedding, to the marital 
breakdown, separation, divorce and, finally, funeral (Morton, 1993; Dimbleby, 1994). In 
public law discourse, however, popular understandings of monarchical life are discounted by 
the insistence on separating ‘constitutional’ issues from what Bogdanor describes as the 
‘personal difficulties’ of the monarchy (1995: 305). Brazier emphasises the need for this 
public/private divide in an article on the Prince of Wales in the leading journal, Public Law: 
 
The many media discussions about him have centred on his ‘fitness’ to be King. An 
analysis is needed of the position of the Prince of Wales in the constitution, centred 
firmly on the constitutional and legal issues which may lie behind the more popular 
topic of whether he is fit to succeed to the throne. (1995: 401; emphasis added) 
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Hence, in relation to the monarchy, law students are firmly directed to ignore the private lives 
of the Royal Family and to focus only on the constitutional aspects of the Monarch 
(succession, the Royal Assent, opening Parliament). Likewise, students are expected to 
understand the very particular relationship between the Monarch and the concept of ‘the 
Crown’ (Sedley, 1994: 289; Smith, 1995). In public law, ‘the expression “the Crown” has 
two meanings, namely the monarch and the executive’ (M v Home Office) and is used in 
many contexts. But, again, the only aspect of monarchy that is considered relevant in 
reference to the Crown is the public duties and powers of the Monarch; the private aspects of 
monarchy are omitted from the scope of public law. 
 
In this article we take issue with this legal orthodoxy, in particular the separation of the 
public and private dimensions of monarchy. Our view is that Bagehot is correct when he 
claims that ‘[a] family on the throne is an interesting idea . . .’ (1872: 38), and we aim to 
revive this neglected aspect of the Bagehot legacy. In the next section, we show that, despite 
the official insistence on separating the ‘constitutional’ from the ‘personal’, the language of 
public law is saturated with terminology that elides the distinction between the concepts of 
Crown as state, Crown as monarch and the personality of the monarch (Goodrich, 1990: 218–
22). This is not a semantic quibble: the end result of this elision is the masking of the sites 
and exercise of political power. More specifically, this masking has hindered the  
development of a concept of the state in public law and, more recently, created difficulties for 
new public lawyers in mapping modern state administration. 
 
THE CROWN AS STATE 
 
In M v Home Office, it was stated that ‘the Crown’ had two meanings, namely the Monarch 
and the executive. This simple statement hides a rash of confusion. It makes no mention of 
the fact that myriad synonyms for the Crown exist in modern public law discourse: 
‘Sovereign’, ‘Her Majesty’s Government’, ‘Ministers of the Crown’, ‘Queen in Parliament’, 
‘Royal Prerogative’, ‘Crown Office’ and so on (Le Sueur and Sunkin, 1997: 46). The 
common feature is that each synonym links the state with monarchical imagery and the 
concept of the Crown. As Harlow and Rawlings (1997), Jacob (1996) and Allison (1997) 
highlight, it is this slippage that has hindered the coherent development of the concept of a 
state within the English common law tradition. 
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Historically, common lawyers, unlike their civil law counterparts, avoided the idea of the 
state in favour of the ‘abstract concept of the crown and the familiar concept of the person or 
individual official’ (Allison, 1997: 77). In recent years, new public law scholarship has 
wrestled with the consequences of this history in its attempts to make sense of the blurring of 
public/private power. Motivated by concern about the diffusion of forms of governance in the 
UK, and the absence of adequate systems of accountability and control, ‘the Crown’ has 
come under renewed scrutiny as an accurate map of late modern state administration. Two 
strands of criticism can be identified: first, the equation of the Crown with traditional central 
government institutions; and, secondly, the benefits that continue to flow to government from 
the legacy of monarchical immunities and powers. 
 
Jacob details how the special status of the Crown has gradually declined as ‘something like a 
State has emerged in Britain’ (1996: 8) in the 20th century. However, the retention of the 
concept of the Crown, with its association with central government, has had the effect of 
screening out ‘the indistinctness of state administration’ (Allison, 1997: 89). This 
indistinctness has three obvious sources: first, the series of contractions and expansions in 
notions of accepted state functions, ranging from the early night-watchman state with 
minimal law-and-order responsibilities, to the welfare state and, more recently, the neo-
liberal distaste for the ‘nanny state’; second, the proliferation of hybrid institutional forms 
which do not fit a state/non-state classification; and thirdly, the increasingly close 
relationship between government and private sector, nurtured through governmental 
bargaining powers (Harlow and Rawlings, 1997). New public lawyers’ attempts to get to 
grips with the state have been further compounded by the privatising practices of post–1979 
governments, including the transfer of public entities to the private sector, and the 
contractualisation of public administration through techniques of ‘deregulation’, ‘contracting 
out’ and ‘internal markets’ (Morison and Livingstone, 1995; Taggart, 1997), and also, more 
recently, via New Labour’s ‘ideas of “contestability”, “best value”, and partnership . . .’ 
(Morison, 1998: 517; Morris, 1999: 66). 
 
In light of this polycentric nature of state administration, it is hardly surprising that the 
abstract concept of the Crown is inadequate as a legal tool to map diffuse governing power. 
Thus, we disagree with Sedley’s claim that ‘[i]t does not matter what you call the state’ (1994: 
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270) when it comes to revitalising UK public law to cope with the above challenges. We 
argue that the Crown can never adequately fulfill this role so long as the legacy of monarchy 
continues to distort perspectives on the sites of public power. 
 
The second strand of new public law criticism of the Crown confirms our impression. Public 
law has been unable to discard all the immunities and privileges that existed in the era when 
monarchical power was unbridled. The present-day ability of the Crown to avoid the effects 
of statutes, and to limit its liability in contract and tort stems from a time of personal 
sovereign power (Vincenzi, 1998: 317). As Harlow and Rawlings point out, government is 
able to continue benefiting from the status of the Crown because of the ‘modern perception of 
the titular head of state as without political power and confined to dignitary functions’: 
 
The monarchical imagery is absurd, and the legal fiction that power is not vested in 
the Prime Minister, Cabinet and other organisms of the modern state but in a royal 
dignitary incapable, in Blackstone’s famous aphorism, not only of doing but even of 
thinking wrong, is dangerous. (Harlow and Rawlings, 1997: 6–7) 
 
The pretense clearly has attractions for government; as Jennings recognised, ‘[t]he State 
functions more easily if it can be personified’ (1966: 120–21). The key to the constitution 
becomes ‘one icon, one family, one Crown’:        
 
Not a day passes without news of the monarchy in all the media: it may be deemed 
trivial but in quantitative terms there is an irrefragable significance to the circulation 
of one symbol, of one icon, of one family, of what we are as represented in the 
comings and goings, the doings and sayings, the court news and the state functions of 
the royalty, the royal family. (Goodrich, 1990: 219) 
 
Public lawyers, however, have begun to respond to the danger of allowing the state to hide 
‘behind the screen of the personalised image of the monarch’ (Harlow and Rawlings, 1997: 
6). There now exist constitutional reform proposals that substitute the Crown for a concept of 
the state via a written constitution (IPPR, 1993), either with or without a monarch remaining 
as head of state (Barnett, 1994; Brazier, 1991: 110). More specifically, the drawn-out 
attempts of the courts to subject Crown powers to judicial review have been criticised (Sedley, 
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1994), as has the extent to which ‘[t]he royal prerogative remains a crucial . . . power in the 
hands of government’ (Vincenzi, 1998: 317) or, more accurately, in the hands of the Prime 
Minister (Blackburn and Plant,  1999b: 150). 
 
We agree with these reform proposals in relation to the Crown, but they are not what interests 
us here. Instead, we want to use the monarchy as a springboard to the wider issue of 
conceptualising state power in public law. Our broader aim is to illustrate that, as well as 
looking towards political science, public administration and other fields, new public law can 
also find resources within the traditional concerns of its own discipline when pushing ahead 
with the project of constitutional renewal. Thus, in the next section, we suggest that the life 
and death of Diana, Princess of Wales, is relevant to a critical theorisation of the late modern 
state. 
 
PRINCESS DIANA AND THE FEMINISATION OF POWER 
 
1997: ANNUS . . . ? 
 
Diana, Princess of Wales, was the most photographed, most discussed member of the Royal 
Family in the last 20 years. In a 1992 essay, Paglia described her as possibly ‘the most 
powerful image in the world popular culture today, a case study in the modern cult of 
celebrity and the way it stimulates atavistic religious emotions’ (1994: 164). Six years later, 
after the Princess’ death, Wilson highlighted just how powerful the image had been, arguing 
that Diana became a ‘living simulacrum . . . a copy without an original, a multiple personality 
with no “real” Diana’ (1998: 140). Diana herself asked to be a ‘Queen of Hearts’; later, after 
her death, the Prime Minister styled her as the ‘People’s Princess’. She was ‘anything and 
everything’ (Wilson, 1998): an ingenue, a story-book bride and a fairy-tale princess; she was 
also a mother, a betrayed wife and lover, a divorcee, a victim and a survivor; after her death, 
she became a saint, a republican, a feminist and a great humanitarian. Through it all, she was 
an international ‘covergirl’: ‘[e]ven leftwing magazines have used her image on their front 
pages: the New Statesman presented a Warhol pastiche; Red Pepper gave us Diana as Che 
Guevara; Living Marxism – I kid you not – thought her face worthy of a cover’ (Greenslade, 
1998: 2). 
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In life, and more so in death, media pundits and opinion-makers swarmed around the Princess, 
feeding ‘the “myth” “Diana” ’ (Wilson, 1998: 137). One version of the Diana story claims 
that the Princess ‘did something that no woman in the royal family has done in the twentieth 
century: she called a monarch to account’ (Campbell, 1998: 251), and that she did it – in part 
at least – by making the private public.4 This ‘publicisation’ worked its way through several, 
by now well-known, stages. First, there was Morton’s book, Diana: Her True Story (1993); 
although, its revelations were tempered by the measures taken to safeguard the Princess’ 
‘deniability’. Morton’s book was followed by a spate of Taj Mahal-type photo opportunities 
and by the Princess’ increasingly public sponsorship of a series of un-Royal charities, 
including homelessness and AIDS. Finally, on Monday evening, 20 November 1995, Diana 
herself ‘gave testimony’ on BBC television’s Panorama programme, and ‘Britain stayed at 
home’ to watch and listen (Campbell, 1998: 213). During the interview, she spoke about 
bulimia, primogeniture, postnatal depression, the paparazzi, love and betrayal, and the 
Establishment. We listened as she used ‘the language of such disparate discourses as  
traditional   romance, psychotherapy and even feminism’ (Smith, 1997: 11). Throughout, we 
watched her publicise the affective and foreground the private, the personal, even the 
confessional.  
 
Two years later, during a week in September 1997, the nation appeared to follow Diana’s 
example as the private became public in an unforeseen, but rapidly hyped, way. This, of 
course, was the week of Diana’s death and funeral, a time when ‘an ectoplasm of emotion 
enveloped the land’ (Wilson, 1998: 141) and ‘[a]nother country stirred . . . an undreamt-of 
pays reel beneath the starched tapestry of the Windsor-Westminster pays legal’ (Nairn, 1998: 
40–41). The week brought flowers, poems and ‘impromptu shrines’ (Paxman, 1998: 241); a 
remodelled pop song; and, as punditry exploded in the search for an explanation for it all, an 
(almost) media-wide eulogy.  
 
Initially, three particular claims were made for the ‘weird convulsion’ (Nairn, 1998: 40) of 
that week: first, it united the country; second, it feminised it; and finally, and most daringly, it 
signposted a future republican nation. Hutton saw the death of Diana as a defining 
constitutional moment, a date from which historians would source change. He was clear that 
‘within a generation the monarchy’s role [would] change, and that Britain [would] look and 
behave much more like a republic’ (Hutton, 1998). Other commentators explained the week’s 
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events as ‘a generalized regret for eighteen years of Thatcherism . . . years of missed 
opportunity and a decline in public  values’ (Wilson, 1998: 141). Orbach chose to twin the 
week of Diana’s death and funeral with 2 May – the day after New Labour’s landslide 
electoral victory, arguing that ‘May and September . . . offered moments of mass 
participation in the life of the nation’: 
 
. . . with Diana’s death, what the individual felt and how he [sic] acted again 
metamorphosed into something larger and more profound than could be expected 
from the singular acts and feelings of individuals. Diana’s death became another 
moment of participation in which there was a claiming and reshaping of public space, 
an insistence that public discourse respect the feelings of the people and a moment of 
potential constitutional change. (Orbach, 1998: 61) 
 
Orbach’s claim is the one that interests us. In particular, we are interested in her description 
of the May/September events as a ‘nascent realignment of politics and emotions’ such that 
‘emotions were no longer only private matters best kept hidden – even from ourselves . . . 
[rather] [e]motions augmented democratisation’ (Orbach, 1998, emphasis added). This claim 
raises the anchor of public and private; more importantly, in an era characterised by 
widespread rewriting or blurring of this boundary, it does it in an unexpected way. By 
arguing that emotions can augment democracy, it places the private-sphere ‘stigmata of 
affectivity’ (Thornton, 1995: 13) on a public sphere which has historically been associated 
with rationality and reason, and then trumpets the outcome as improved democracy. Amid 
prevailing trends which push private market virtues and characterise privatisation as the way 
to improve public rule, this blurring of public and private brings an entirely different set of 
private norms into the public domain. In this way, it represents a rather different take on the 
question of how to invigorate the public sphere. As we see it, Orbach’s claim fits with the 
recent popular interest in ‘feminisation’, in particular with what has been described as the 
feminisation of the public sphere.  
 
The latter is hard to pin down (not least because it has been spin-doctored), but its popularity 
is undeniable: as Moore points out ‘the word you are most likely to read about these days is 
not feminism but feminisation’ (1998: 20). The affective has been embraced by late modern 
governments and workplaces: the Blair government promotes a more emotive, ‘ “just call me 
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Tony” ’ style (Moore, 1998: 20) and corporate giants claim that the future is feminine and 
that people skills, flexibility and intuition will be the prized attributes of the millennial public 
sphere (Clarke and Newman, 1997: 73). 
 
Specific claims about the feminisation of the public sphere seem to cluster around two 
particular developments. First, the ‘genderquake’ of the 1997 UK general election – when 
New Labour captured women’s votes, particularly young women’s votes – resulted in a 
dramatic increase in women’s presence in the machinery of government (Thomson, 1999). 
More women MPs were returned in 1997 than ever before, generating column inches, 
photocalls and television programmes as well as the sobriquet ‘Blair’s Babes’. And as 
Wilkinson explains: 
 
When the photo image of Blair standing on the steps of Church House flanked by 100 
female MPs was relayed around the world within days of New Labour’s election 
victory, we were all left in no doubt that the force of the ‘genderquake’ had finally hit 
parliamentary politics itself. (1998: 58) 
 
The second development feeding recent speculation about a feminisation of the public sphere 
concerns the shift in the style of government under New Labour (Leonard, 1998). Blair’s 
government does not respect the polarity between public and private; in fact, it keenly 
appropriates the language of affection, emotion and intimacy. Consider, for example, the 
language of New Labour government policies about ‘bringing rights home’ and practising 
‘tough love’ to ‘help individuals to help themselves’. Moreover, as Weldon points out, New 
Labour certainly presents itself as female: it uses ‘the language of compassion, forgiveness, 
apology, understanding and nurturing . . . It wants to be loved. The old traditionally male 
values of constancy, gravitas, restraint, heroism, dignity and honour are seen as belonging to 
a past world’ (1999). 
 
AS TIME GOES BY 
 
Later commentaries on the week of Diana’s death and the New Labour ‘genderquake’ have 
been far more mixed than the early ones; they also contain few grand claims about 
republicanism, nationhood or feminisation. Talk of republicanism petered out early on and, as 
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Nairn explains, what had initially been perceived as a fracture was ultimately reread as 
traditional instinct: 
 
British popular monarchism established a very powerful fusion of nationality and 
personality, a channeled identity which worked by separation of the charismatic and 
the political state . . . The heart which burst into the streets in September was as yet 
far from that of a republic. It remains that of a national romanticism. (Nairn, 1997: 6) 
 
Orbach’s enthusiasm for what she had first seen as a positive realignment of politics and 
emotion also dried up. She argued that ‘[t]he moment [of May and September] had been 
turned on its head’; that feminisation had become emotionalism; and that the latter had 
corrupted public space. Thus, rather than emotions augmenting democracy, ‘deeper issues 
were [now] subsumed under a screeching of ersatz emotionalism’. Citing the cases of Louise 
Woodward and Mary Bell, she noted how: 
 
. . . our interest is now drawn to stories of wrongdoing. Our newspapers campaign on 
the side of the alleged victims or the alleged perpetrators, plucking at our heart strings 
to engender support where the underlying structural issues are set aside or remain 
unaddressed . . . We are left with a sense of participation through superficially shared 
emotional expression rather than a linking of the political, economic, social and 
emotional issues that these cases pose. (Orbach, 1998: 62) 
 
Wilson never had any truck with official explanations of the week of Diana’s death. Claims 
about mass participation, augmented democracy and feminisation of the public sphere had 
always struck her as somewhat facile: ‘if it was “compassion”, it had no “hard edge” . . . 
Mourning for Diana . . . was softcentred in the extreme [and] emotion, divorced from and 
devoid of content, is not simply vacuous but dangerous’ (1998: 142). Wilson also sensed that 
modern British culture craved goodness and caring without hard choices, and that ‘[g]rief for 
Diana expressed that perfectly’. Why? Because, ‘[y]ou could emote all you wanted without 
having to give anything up’ (1998: 141). 
 
The feminisation of government is also considered a let-down. Consider the evidence: the 
Minister for Women, currently Baroness Jay, confirms feminists’ suspicions about ‘women’s 
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work’: she does a double shift, combining her work in the House of Lords with the Women’s 
ministry; more importantly, she does the second shift without pay. The Social Exclusion Unit 
towers over the Women’s Unit: indeed, the latter has been relocated three times in less than 
two years. Labour women MPs, erstwhile ‘babes’, have been recast by the media as ‘the 
fixers and the nannies of the Government’ (Wilkinson, 1998: 59). The quota politics of 1970s 
and 1980s Labour feminism have been decommissioned: the Prime Minister is said to prefer 
‘androgynous’ politics – basically, a gender-neutral politics that ‘mainstreams’, rather than 
foregrounds, women’s issues. Wilkinson senses that there is spin at work here: 
 
what is dressed up as New Labour’s androgynous political culture actually turns out 
not to be so androgynous after all – behind the veneer of feminization, it actually turns 
out to be pretty male. Boyish New Laddism is its offshoot, and is all the more 
insidious precisely because it is rooted in the language of modernity, the language of 
androgyny. (1998: 59) 
 
This claim resonates with Brown’s analysis of the late modern American state. In her book, 
States of Injury (1995), Brown highlights parallels between the late modern state and late 
modern masculinity, in particular the so-called ‘new man’, and points out that the state is not 
above playing perceived ‘impotence’ to its own advantage: 
 
[L]ike the so-called new man, the late modern state also represents itself as 
pervasively hamstrung, quasi-impotent, unable to come through on many of its 
commitments, because it is decentralizing itself, because ‘it is no longer the solution 
to social problems,’ because it is ‘but one player on a global chessboard,’ or because 
it has foregone much of its power in order to become ‘kinder, gentler.’ The central 
paradox of the late modern state thus resembles a central paradox of late modern 
masculinity: its power and privilege operate increasingly through disavowal of 
potency, repudiation of responsibility, and the diffusion of sites and operations of 
control. (1995: 193–4) 
 
Thus, Brown portrays the late 20th-century American state as a modern Janus – protector and 
foe, pervasive and intangible, potent and subordinated by privatisation and globalisation, 
incoherent and dominating – with many different and overlapping powers. Moreover, like its 
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British counterpart, the American state is inconsistently gendered: it is feminised; 
androgynous; emasculated; New Mannish; and New Laddish. The question Brown raises is: 
why are the complexities and contradictions of this type of late modern state power largely 
unacknowledged in critical theory and progressive political activism? 
 
TOWARDS FEMINISATION 
 
Brown may be overly pessimistic about the lack of acknowledgement of modern governing 
forms. In the UK, new public law is examining aspects of late capitalist state power. There is 
a healthy interest in privatisation and contractualisation, and also in public law values and 
their overlap, if any, with private law virtues (Oliver, 1997). To date, however, this interest 
has been somewhat narrowly tailored, neglecting aspects of the contemporary blurring of 
public and private. One area of neglect has been what was described above as the 
‘feminisation of government’. In this final section, we aim to remedy this by moving beyond 
popular disappointment with this phenomenon in order to assess its radical political potential. 
We do this by considering the effects of adopting intimate-sphere norms in public-sphere 
decision making, in particular the claim that emotion can augment democracy. 
 
Clearly there are dangers in this approach. It is arguable that the idea of the ‘feminisation of 
government’ is little more than a spin doctor’s tool. Ascribing radical political significance to 
the phenomenon may be the product of sociological naïveté. There has already been criticism 
of the tendency towards ‘spontaneist populism’ in certain branches of cultural studies. 
McNay cautions against ‘short-circuited movement from the ontological to the political’; the 
elision of ‘a process of symbolic destabilization with processes of social and political 
transformation’ such that ‘some theories of reflexive transformation overestimate the 
significance of the expressive possibilities available to men and women in late capitalist 
society’ (1999: 106). Hennessy (1995) makes a similar point in arguing that making the 
previously private public is not inherently emancipatory or subversive, especially if it 
involves processes of commodification or what has been described as the ‘Oprahfication’ of 
everyday life (Moore, 1998: 20). Hence, visibility alone is no guarantee of progressive 
outcomes; furthermore, it has to be remembered that how visibility is conceptualised matters. 
It is also worth emphasising the risks of essentialism that attach to describing the new 
centrality of intimacy to public-sphere governing as a process of ‘feminisation’ (although the 
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inconsistent gendering of the late modern state in descriptions of this phenomenon – 
feminised, androgynous, emasculated, New Mannish and New Laddish – does highlight the 
‘uneasy suturing’ and ‘potential conflict’ that lie behind the ‘idealized fictions’ of dominant 
understandings of both masculinity and femininity (McNay, 1999: 108)). 
 
We accept that there are real risks in over-celebrating the idea of feminising the public sphere. 
Mixed feelings abound about the development of a concept like the ‘caring’ war, as when 
‘humanitarian’ reasons are used to justify NATO’s sustained bombing of Serbia and 
politicians opt for photo opportunities at refugee camps rather than traditional military 
environments. It also seems that the feminisation of ‘law and order’ discourse more generally 
has potentially troubling spin-offs. This manifests itself most clearly in the new 
‘criminologies of intolerance’. As Jock Young (1999) points out, there are parallels between 
feminism’s discourse of ‘zero-tolerance’ against crimes against women and other, 
conservative (and vastly more publicised) discourses of ‘zero-tolerance’ (such as Kelling and 
Coles’ famous Fixing Broken Windows philosophy (1997) which is conventionally (but 
controversially) linked to New York City’s policing ‘miracle’): 
 
Both wish to reduce tolerance – to, in the phrase, ‘define deviancy up’. And both are 
concerned with a range of infractions: that is they are worried by both what are 
regarded by all as serious offences and by the more minor ‘quality of life’ crimes 
(Young, 1999: 138). 
 
Unfortunately, the lack of emphasis on the differences between these two ‘zero-tolerance’ 
discourses has led to the neglect of valuable feminist (and realist) insights about the 
continuum of violence, and the rise of allegedly ‘feminised’ criminal justice programmes 
which separate crime from the causes of crime, and replace genuine debate about ‘community 
safety’, ‘inclusiveness’ and ‘accountability’ with child curfews and anti-social behaviour 
orders (see Crime and Disorder Act 1998; Piper, 1999). 
 
So, there are risks associated with feminisation. However, we still want to argue that there 
may be a potential upside and that, as such, feminisation merits deeper consideration. At 
present, feminisation may be ‘spin’, non-politics or regressive politics, but outcomes are not 
predictable and it may be possible to capture the concept for more progressive political ends. 
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In the following paragraphs, we suggest that recent work by Young (1997), Harvison Young 
(1997) and Cooper (1998, 1999) provides some starting points for this project. 
 
As noted above, Morison proposes constitutional renewal as a necessary supplement to New 
Labour’s current constitutional reform project. His project is based, in part, on following 
through on the insights of deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1996). Thus, the focus is ‘not 
more or even better refined aggregrative democracy but more and better democratic 
deliberation’ (Morison, 1998: 531). It is about turning attention to ‘process and participation’ 
rather than institutions per se, and designing devices such as ‘consultation requirements, 
vetoes, and conditions of minimum consensus’ in order to ‘maximize participation in all the 
agencies, quangos, networks . . . that make up the public space within the new and more 
complex conditions of governance today’ (1998: 533–4). 
 
Young (1997), however, highlights the need to temper this new enthusiasm for deliberative 
democracy with a socio-cultural awareness of the myriad ways in which inequality infects 
even formally inclusive public spheres or  deliberative bodies. Her proposals fit neatly with 
our interest in ‘feminising’ the public sphere. Young argues that many advocates of 
discussion-based theories of democracy restrict deliberation to a particular range of 
communicative forms and styles of speaking, privileging argument, reason and dispassionate, 
disembodied speech: 
 
Norms of deliberation . . . tend to presuppose an opposition between mind and body, 
reason and emotion. They tend . . . to identify objectivity with calm and absence of 
emotional expression. Thus expressions of anger, hurt and passionate concern 
discount the claims and reasons they accompany. Similarly, the entrance of the body 
into speech – in wide gestures, movements of nervousness, or body expression of 
emotion – are signs of weakness that cancel out one’s assertions or reveal one’s lack 
of objectivity and control. (1997: 65) 
 
These norms of deliberation result in cultural bias; they privilege ‘the dispassionate, the 
educated and those who feel they have a right to assert’ (1997: 73). Young believes that the 
norms contain a particular bias towards the speech culture of white middle-class men, 
wherein communication ‘tends to be more controlled, without significant gesture and 
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expression of emotion’ (1997: 73). She addresses this bias through what she calls an 
‘expanded conception of democratic communication’ and, as noted above, we believe that 
this proposal fits with our interest in using intimate-sphere norms to democratise public-
sphere debate and decision making. Under Young’s broadened conception of deliberative 
democracy, conventionally prized political speech is made to cede ground to norms of 
deliberation more closely associated with the intimate sphere. The result is that political 
deliberation opens out into communication as opposed to mere speech. In addition, the 
traditional allegiance to norms of assertiveness, combativeness, orderliness and ‘literal’ 
language (as opposed to figurative language, like metaphor or hyperbole, or body language, 
like gesticulation or tears) receives a substantial and timely jolt. 
 
Cooper’s work suggests another possible starting point for ‘feminising’ the public sphere. 
She explores the idea of ‘governing out of order’– where institutions exceed the boundaries 
of their role and authority – and considers the progressive possibilities that may flow from 
excessive governance (1998, 1999). One of her case studies concerns a cluster of local 
government cases – Wheeler (1985), Shell (1988), Times Newspapers (1986) and Fewings 
(1995) – involving controversial public authority decision making. Each case involved 
judicial review of a local government decision to rescind funds, land or contracts from bodies 
whose actions were opposed by the council; for example, Fewings concerned Somerset 
council’s decision to withdraw permission to hunt deer across council-owned land from the 
Quantock Staghounds. In each case, judicial hostility was directed at local government for 
moving outside perceived statutory discretion, and for flouting the boundaries of ‘proper’ 
public authority. 
 
Cooper analyses the ideologies underlying the courts’ depiction of these particular council 
decisions as arbitrary and in absolute contradiction to the imperative of rational decision 
making. She argues that the judicial condemnation was connected with a fear that the 
councils had ‘feminised’ public sphere decision making. First, local government had ‘placed 
inappropriate demands upon others: what could be said; with whom they could associate [. . . 
and] were unable to maintain ordered, consistent boundaries in the allocation of power, 
responsibilities, and autonomy’. Secondly, it had flouted ‘principles of proper punishment’ by 
punishing according to feminised, domestic-sphere norms: 
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Within the judicial imagination, councils over-react; they act out of emotion and  
partisan feelings rather than reason. As Swinton Thomas LJ, declared in Fewings, ‘the 
[council] debate was in fact fuelled to a substantial extent by antipathy to the hunters 
as opposed to a perceived cruelty to the deer’. (Cooper, 1999: 266–7) 
 
Interestingly, the judicial condemnation is marked, not by a rejection of all private-sphere 
norms, but by a strict demarcation between them. Certain private-sphere norms are deemed to 
merit expression in municipal decision making; for example, in the courts’ account, the ideal 
council would resemble a market-driven organisation, grounded in the rational, efficient 
norms of the private, commercial domain. But private, intimate-sphere norms are treated very 
differently by the courts; in these cases, local government is heavily censured for bringing 
them into the public sphere.  
 
Judges themselves face strict rules about what they can bring to their particular public-sphere 
decision making. When challenged on the ground of bias, assessment of a judge’s 
impartiality turns upon an examination of possible financial, proprietary or personal interests 
in the outcome of litigation (In re Pinochet, 1999). While the first two grounds present little 
problem, the third raises more intriguing questions. When does the ‘personal’ corrupt judicial 
decision making? What contexts trigger such allegations? Must we choose between the 
fiction of ‘tabula rasa impartiality’ or the ‘arbitrariness of whatever “baggage” the particular 
decision-maker carries’? Harvison Young argues that we can sidestep this dichotomy: 
 
The focus should shift from the ‘baggage’ that we all have to the enterprise of making 
judgements . . . [O]ne might begin by being less concerned about the possibility that 
[a judge] was ‘biased’ at the outset, and more concerned with her reasons in 
themselves. (1997: 347–8) 
 
Like Young and Cooper, Harvison Young is committed to questioning prevailing views about 
governing behaviour. All three seem to us to provide new ways of thinking about 
democratising the public sphere by using the new centrality of the intimate as a progressive 
tool for governance. Admittedly, the argument that ‘emotions can augment democracy’ does 
have limits. ‘Feminising’ the public sphere cannot be an excuse for a free-for-all or chat-
show sentimentalisation or emotionalism. Nor is it our intention that this blurring of the 
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personal and the political should validate the political quietism of much contemporary 
lifestyle culture. Or that it should bolster ‘law and order’ discourse, justify ‘tough love’ 
coercive practices, or mask difficult questions about military interventions. Limits will have 
to be set. In thinking about such limits, we suggest that a decent baseline involves 
recognising that ‘the validity of transgressing the boundaries of institutional role, rights and 
responsibilities depends on the motivating norms and values – in particular . . . whether [it] 
occurs in the pursuit of social and economic justice’ (Cooper, 1998: 7). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
New public law has a keen interest in the deployment of power and the shifting nature of the 
public and private. In this article, we have argued that the historical legacy of the Crown has 
hindered public lawyers’ ability to develop an adequate concept of the state and to respond to 
changes in modes of governance in the UK. The constitutional law textbook tradition has 
played a key role in limiting critiques of the Crown because of the obfuscation that surrounds 
the legal and political status of the Monarch. However, instead of discounting the 
significance of the monarchy, we have used it as a resource to explore governing power, the 
blurring of boundaries, and constitutional renewal. Thus, we have shown how the funeral of 
Diana, Princess of Wales, exposed the political relevance of the ‘personal’ in a most dramatic 
way, generating claims about the ‘feminisation of the government’ and ‘emotions augmenting 
democracy’. We followed through on these claims in order to focus on what we think is an 
intriguing question for new public law: the effects of adopting private, intimate-sphere norms 
in the public sphere, in particular in public-sphere decision making. Our brief study of this 
question suggested that, while there are risks associated with such a ‘transformation’ of 
democracy, there is no doubt that the increasing centrality of the intimate does merit 
consideration in new public law’s search for progressive tools of modern governance. 
 
NOTES 
Our thanks to the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. 
 
1. For some of the reasons why Northern Ireland constitutionalism does not excite the same 
interest, see Morison and Livingstone (1995) and O’Leary (1997).  
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2. The abdication of Edward VIII in 1936 because of his relationship with Wallis Simpson 
provides another rich resource for an exploration of the public/private aspects of monarchy. 
While ‘the ostensible cause of the King’s departure was his refusal to accept the advice of his 
ministers that he could not marry a divorced woman’ (Pimlott, 1997: 38), it remains unclear 
the extent to which this aspect of his ‘personal’ life was seized upon by both Establishment 
and media to deflect attention away from the rather more serious fact that ‘his political  
sympathies were certainly pro-German and perhaps pro-Nazi’ (Cannadine, 1997: 47). 
 
3. ‘The use of the Queen, in a dignified capacity, is incalculable. . . . The English Monarchy 
strengths our government with the strength of religion. . . . It would be a very serious matter 
to us to change every four or five years the visible head of our world. . . . Above all things 
our royalty is to be reverenced, and if you begin to poke about it you cannot reverence it’ 
(Bagehot, 1872: 33, 46, 59). 
 
4. For another twist on Diana and public/private, see Story’s (1998) account of treating Diana 
as intellectual property: ‘Given that Diana was a public figure par excellence and given the 
particular relationships and intimacy, real or imagined, that existed between Diana and her 
legions while she was alive, should private parties be given the power, now that she is dead, 
to exclude others – or exclude them unless they pay a licensing fee charged, in turn, to 
consumers? Should Diana’s value, which during her lifetime lacked “private propertiness” 
because of its endless supply and its royal connection, now become commodified as private 
property, a scarce intellectual property resource?’. 
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